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TORT LAW-Supreme Court Permits Design Defect
Claims in Both Strict Liability and Negligence: Brooks v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that all product liability design defect claims, including crashworthiness claims, 2 may be brought in strict liability.3 The court also held
that a defendant's compliance with all applicable regulations, codes, or
standards does not vitiate a crashworthiness design defect claim. 4 Brooks
overruled5 Duran v. General Motors Corp. ,6 which held that negligence
was the proper standard of liability for crashworthiness claims in either
manufacturing defect or design defect actions. 7 Thus, prior to Brooks,
design defect crashworthiness claims in New Mexico were grounded only
in negligence and express warranty law.' A further holding of the Duran
court, also overruled by Brooks, was that the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant violated "extrajudicial standards" in design defect crashworthiness claims. 9 Following Brooks, plaintiffs may pursue design defect
claims such as crashworthiness claims under a strict liability theory even
when the defendant complied with all the applicable regulations, codes,
and standards for its design.' 0 Consequently, compliance with objective,
extrajudicial standards, including regulations, codes, or industry standards
does not conclusively establish that the product was designed without a
defect." This Note discusses the history of the "crashworthiness" doctrine,
analyzes the reasoning of the Brooks court, including the underlying
policy considerations, and explores the implications of this case for New
Mexico.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 2, 1988, Thomas Brooks died when his 1968 Beech Musketeer
airplane crashed near Cimarron, New Mexico.' 2 Subsequently, Virginia

1. 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (1995).
2. The term "crashworthiness claims" refers to claims for injuries sustained that were aggravated
or exacerbated due to a product defect. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
3. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 373, 902 P.2d at 55.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 377-79, 902 P.2d at 59-61.
6. 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963
(1984).
7. Id. at 743, 688 P.2d at 780.
8. See id.
9. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 381, 902 P.2d at 63.
10. Id. at 373, 902 P.2d at 55.
11. Id. at 381-82, 902 P.2d at 63-64.
12. Unless subsequently cited, the facts of this case appear at Brooks, 120 N.M. at 373, 902
P.2d at 55.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Brooks (Brooks), as personal representative of the estate of her late
husband, brought a wrongful death action against Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech), the manufacturer of the plane. Brooks claimed that a
defect in the plane's engine caused the plane to crash and that the absence
of shoulder harnesses caused her husband to suffer an enhanced injury
resulting in his death. Brooks filed suit in negligence and strict liability
for alleged design defects, breach of warranties, and misrepresentations.
Beech filed a motion for summary judgment on Brooks' claims of
breach of warranty, misrepresentation, defective engine, and defective
design of the aircraft for not having shoulder harnesses. The trial court
granted Beech's motion on all claims. Brooks only appealed that portion
of the trial court's order that granted Beech's summary judgment on the
design defect claim. Specifically, Brooks challenged the trial court's holding that "enhanced-injury claims sound only in negligence and that
negligence in design must be proved by showing the product violated the
government regulations or industry standards applicable at the time of
design." The Supreme Court of New Mexico granted Brook's petition
for a writ of certiorari to review that issue.
III.

BACKGROUND

Recognition of the Enhanced Injury, Crashworthiness, or Second
Collision Doctrine
Traditionally, under the enhanced injury doctrine, courts refused to
recognize any liability simply because a product was not designed to
prevent or reduce injury. 3 As a result, a manufacturer was liable for
injuries caused by its product only if it was defective for its intended
purpose.'4 Judicial recognition of a change in this traditional view can
be traced to Judge Kiley's dissent in Evans v. General Motors Corp. 5
In Evans, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an automobile
was not unfit for its intended use merely because it could not safely
collide with other vehicles, despite the foreseeability of such collisions. 6
Judge Kiley rejected the majority position and found that General Motors
had a duty "to use such care in designing its automobiles that reasonable
protection is given purchasers against 7 death and injury from accidents
which are expected and foreseeable."
Judge Kiley's dissent in Evans foreshadowed the landmark case of
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.'8 in which the doctrine of "enhanced

A.

13. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836, (1966).
14. Id. See also Barry Levenstarn & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiff's Burden of Proving Enhanced
Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DEPAuL L. REV. 55, 58 (1988)
(citations omitted).
15. 359 F.2d at 827 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 824-25.
17. Id. at 827 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
18. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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injury,"' 19 "crashworthiness," 20 or "second collision ' ' 21 was first recognized. These terms, which are often used interchangeably,22 refer to a
doctrine created to address injuries that were aggravated or exacerbated
by a product defect when the defect did not cause the original accident.
The Larsen court rejected the majority opinion in Evans, recognized the
enhanced injury doctrine, and held that a manufacturer has "a reasonable
duty of care in the design of its vehicle consonant with the state of the

art to minimize the effect of accidents" and "should be liable for the
injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care in the design. ' 23
B.

Development of the Enhanced Injury or Crashworthiness Doctrine
Federal courts have taken the lead in adopting and defining the parameters of the enhanced injury doctrine 24 in spite of the fact that there
is no federal common law in product liability cases. 25 This unique development resulted from the application of the Erie doctrine to diversity
cases filed in federal court. 26 Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
federal courts deciding diversity cases must apply the law of the state. 27
However, in the absence of established state law, the Erie doctrine allows
a federal court to predict what a state court would do if presented with
a problem such as an enhanced injury claim. 28 Even though federal courts
have complained about the need to "resort to tea leaves or to judicial

tarot cards," ' 29 the task of making predictions based on "unauthoritative

and diverse prognostications," 3 0 and of making decisions while "straining

for clairvoyance,"'" state courts agree with the adoption of the enhanced

32
injury doctrine.

19. Id. at 502. "Enhanced injury" is the degree that injuries are aggravated above and beyond
what they would have been without the alleged design defect. 2A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21.03, at 21-28 to 21-29 (1990).
20. "Crashworthiness" is the protection provided to passengers of vehicles in anticipation of
collisions. For judicial definitions of the term, see Michael Hoenig, Resolution of "Crashworthiness"
Design Claims, 55 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 633, 633 n.l (1981) (citing Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974)).
21. "Second collision" is the impact with the interior part of the vehicle or something exterior
to the vehicle after the initial collision. See Hoenig, supra note 20, at 634 n.2.
22. See, e.g., Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 838-39 n.7 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 867 (1981) (The court found that the terms "crashworthiness" and "injury enhancement"
are "interchangeable."); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3rd Cir. 1976) (The court referred
to "[t]he crashworthy or second collision theory of liability" and "the analysis of 'second collision'
or 'enhanced injury' cases.").
23. 391 F.2d at 502-03.
24. See Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C. L. REV.
643, 644 (1984). See also FRUMER & FREEDMAN, supra note 19, § 21.02, n.59 at 21-25 (providing
an extensive list of enhanced injury federal court decisions).
25. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 21.02, at 21-24 (citations omitted).
26. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
27. 304 U.S. at 78.
28. See McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
29. Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (6th Cir. 1983).
30. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1976).
31. Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 771 (5th Cir. 1976).
32. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 21.02, at 21-26.
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Despite some initial opposition," by 1991 every state had adopted some
form of the enhanced injury doctrine first enunciated by the Larsen court
and developed by other federal courts.14 In fact, the Seventh Circuit
eventually even overruled Evans,35 noting that the Evans opinion was "a
distinct minority" and "[tihe majority of the courts have now adopted
...Larsen."36 In dicta, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[tihe discernible
trend in products liability law has been to increase the duty owed by
manufacturers for injuries caused by their products." 3 7 In 1991, West
Virginia became the last state to accept the enhanced injury doctrine.
Following the lead of the Eighth Circuit in Larsen, which held that
the duty of care to protect against enhanced injury was applicable to
manufacturers of all products, 9 courts have expanded the application of
the doctrine from automobiles to a wide range of products, including
airplanes, 40 fire extinguishers, 41 motorcycle helmets, 42 and smoke detectors. 43 This is a significant expansion considering that any and all products
could be subject to litigation. 44 One commentator has opined that, today,
enhanced injury is "truly an area limited only by the imagination of
counsel."1

45

The Enhanced Injury or CrashworthinessDoctrine in New Mexico
Prior to Brooks
Prior to the decision in Brooks, the Tenth Circuit, applying the Erie
doctrine, allowed the user of a private aircraft to recover for his injuries
C.

33. See id. § 21.02, n.25 at 21-14 & nn.48 & 49 at 21-18.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§

11,

Reporters'

Note to cmt. a,

at

279 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. [The RESTATEMENT has not yet been
formally promulgated by the American Law Institute. The most recent version, Tentative Draft No.
2 (March 13, 1995), was submitted to the Council of the Members of The American Law Institute
for discussion at the 72nd Annual meeting in May of 1995.) For an exhaustive listing of jurisdictions,
by state and federal decisions, that have accepted the crashworthiness doctrine, see FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 21.02, n.50 at 21-19 to 21-23.
35. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Indiana law).
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991).
39. 391 F.2d at 504.
40. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540, (10th Cir. 1989) (applying New Mexico
law). Plaintiff claimed that the lack of shoulder straps in the rear seat enhanced the pilot's injuries.
Id. at 1542.
41. Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying New Mexico law).
Plaintiff, whose plane crashed while spraying crops, alleged that his injuries were increased because
post-collision, inter alia, a fire extinguisher failed to function. Id. at 789.
42. Coy v. Simpson Marine Safety Equip. Inc., 787 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying New
Hampshire law). Plaintiff claimed a motorcycle accident would have been survivable but for a
defective motorcycle helmet. Id. at 21
43. Butler v. Pittway Corp., 770 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York law). Smoke detectors
in plaintiff's house allegedly aggravated the damages by not sounding a timely alarm. Id. at 8. For
an extensive list of products against which plaintiffs have asserted the enhanced injury doctrine,
see FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, § 21.02, n.l at 21-6 to 21-10.
44. Hoenig, supra note 20, at 647.
45. W. James Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600, 621 (1977).
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under an enhanced injury theory.46 In that case, Meil v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., the plaintiff alleged that his injuries were enhanced as the result
fire extinguisher, and hopper conof a defective seat belt, fuel system,
47
taining insecticide in the plane.
Three years later, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Duran v.
General Motors Corp., held that the plaintiff could state a cause of
action based on a claim under the enhanced injury, crashworthiness, or
second collision doctrine. 48 The court in Duran, however, limited recovery
to claims based exclusively on negligence in design or manufacturing
defects. 49 The court specifically rejected recovery based on strict liability
standards reasoning that "[t]he most serious shortcoming of a strict
product liability approach as applied to crashworthiness results from a
case-by-case method of establishing automobile safety requirements." 50
The Duran court thus joined the Third Circuit which held that the
adjudication of crashworthiness claims under a strict liability standard
would impose conflicting requirements on manufacturers in that automobile safety standards would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.5'
To illustrate, the Duran court cited two cases with opposite safety standard
design claims.5 2 Thus, in addition to holding that crashworthiness claims
sounded only in negligence, the Duran court found that "extrajudicially
established guidelines" and not the adjudicatory process should be used
to establish consistent "design choice criteria." 5 3
Although the Tenth Circuit had recognized an enhanced injury or
crashworthiness cause of action prior to Brooks, the only New Mexico
state court opinion recognizing such a cause of action was the Duran
decision, which restricted recovery to negligence claims.5 4 The trial court
in Brooks relied upon the Duran opinion for its holding that "enhancedinjury claims sound only in negligence and that negligence in design must
be proved by showing the product violated the government regulations
or industry standards applicable at the time of design." 55 It was this
holding that the plaintiff in Brooks challenged on appeal.

46. Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying New Mexico law).
47. Id.
48. 101 N.M. 742, 745, 688 P.2d 779, 782 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685
P.2d 963 (1984).
49. Id. at 749, 688 P.2d at 786.
50. Id. at 745, 688 P.2d at 782.
51. Id.
52. Id.
In Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 .F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970), the claim was
that the windshield should have been designed to 'pop out' in an accident, whereas
in Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir. 1981) [cert. denied, 454
U.S. 867 (1981)], itwas claimed that the windshield should have been designed to
remain in place in high-speed upset. Obviously, automobile manufacturers cannot
redesign their cars from accident to accident.
Id.
53. Duran, 101 N.M. at 747, 688 P.2d at 784 (quoting Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 268
N.W.2d 291, 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)).
54. Id. at 743, 688 P.2d at 780.
55. Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 373, 902 P.2d 54, 55 (1995).
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RATIONALE OF THE BROOKS COURT

In Brooks, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that a manufacturer could be held strictly liable in design defect claims because the
56
benefits of imposing strict liability outweighed any other considerations.
The court reached this conclusion after weighing the policy considerations
that supported imposing a strict liability standard in design defect cases
against those that favored limiting liability to a negligence standard.5 7 In
fact, the court robustly affirmed each of the policy considerations that
it discussed underlying strict products liability." Moreover, the court
determined that a plaintiff did not have to show that a manufacturer
had violated any applicable regulations, codes, or standards to prove a
defective design claim. 59
A.

Policies in Support of Applying Only Negligence Principles to
Design Defect Claims
Beech asserted that since there are no objective standards for defectiveness in the design context, negligence was the suitable standard to
determine liability for defective design. 60 In support of this contention,
Beech argued that the design of a product is the result of the manufacturer's conduct. Whether a product is "safe enough" depends upon
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's decisions on issues such as safety
factors, the usefulness of the product, and associated costs in light of
an anticipated sales price. The reasonableness of these choices is therefore
best tested under a negligence standard.
Beech also argued that there was a distinction between a product with
a manufacturing defect and one with a design defect. 61 A product with
a manufacturing defect leaves the manufacturer's hands in an unintended
condition, whereas a product with a design defect leaves the manufacturer's hands in exactly the condition intended. 62 The product with a
manufacturing defect can be compared with other items in the same
product line to determine if it is defective. 6 A product with a design
64
defect, however, cannot be compared with any objective standard.
The Brooks court rejected this argument on the grounds that New
Mexico uses an "unreasonable-risk-of-injury" test rather than a comparison to a "prototype. '65 The court quoted Uniform Jury Instructions
(UJI) in support of its findings.6

56. Id. at 373, 379, 383, 902 P.2d at 55, 61, 65.
57. Id. at 374-79, 902 P.2d at 56-61.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 373, 381-83, 902 P.2d at 55, 63-65.
60. Id. at 375, 902 P.2d at 57.
61. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 374, 902 P.2d at 56.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 381, 902 P.2d at 61.
66. Id. ("Under the current product liability jury instructions, SCRA 1986, 13-1401 to 13-1433
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Beech also asserted that negligence as a standard for defective design
is conducive to product development. 67 Imposing a strict liability standard
may deprive the public of "useful and beneficial products. ' 6 When a
product is deemed defectively designed, then the entire product line is
defective. 69 This would create a significant financial burden on the manufacturer and the public would be deprived of a product.70
Finally, Beech argued that because of continuing technical advances
and societal changes it would be unfair to subject manufacturers to a
strict liability standard in enhanced injury cases. 7' Specifically, safety
attitudes and manufacturing abilities are very different today from ten,
twenty, or thirty years ago. It would, therefore, not be equitable to hold
a manufacturer liable under
today's safety standards for something man72
ufactured in the 1960s.
The Brooks court rejected this argument concluding that a manufacturer
is usually aware of the risks presented by a given design and the availability
of alternative designs.73 Based on this presumption, the Brooks court
determined that the focus of the investigation should be on the product,
not the manufacturer's conduct. 74 Thus, a strict liability standard is more
knowledge
appropriate because it "imposes whai amounts to constructive
75
of the condition of the product" on the manufacturer.
Policies in Support of Applying Strict Liability Standards to
Design Defect Claims
The Brooks court drew upon its earlier decision in Stang v. Hertz
Corp.,76 which first adopted strict tort liability in New Mexico, for most
of the four policy considerations that it concluded supported adopting
a strict liability standard for defective design claims. 77 These four policies
are (1) distributing cost rationale, (2) relieving plaintiff of the burden
of proving negligence, (3) providing full chain of supply protection, and

B.

(Repl. Pamp. 1991), the jury is instructed that a supplier's liability is measured by 'an unreasonable
risk of injury resulting from a condition of the product or from a manner of its use.' UJI 131406 ..... '[An unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably prudent person having
full knowledge of the risk would find unacceptable.' UJI 13-1407 . . . . '[yjou should consider the
ability to eliminate the risk without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it
unduly expensive.' Id.").
67. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 374, 902 P.2d at 56.
68. Id. at 375, 902 P.2d at 57.
69. Id. (quoting Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670 (1984)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Beech's argument that "manufacturers would be 'whipsawed . . . between the
standards of different generations."').
73. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 381, 902 P.2d at 63.
74. Id. (quoting Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (1985) (en banc)).
75. Id. at 381, 902 P.2d at 63 (quoting Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036
(Or. 1974) (en banc)).
76. 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
77. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 376-77, 902 P.2d at 58-59 (citing Stang, 83 N.M. at 735, 497 P.2d
at 737).
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by imposing the cost of loss on the
(4) serving the interest of fairness
78
party who earned the profit.
The primary policy consideration discussed by the court in support of79
imposing strict products liability was the cost distribution rationale.
Under the cost distribution rationale, the manufacturer or supplier is
considered to be in a better position to absorb the loss by distributing
the cost than is the consumer.A0 The Brooks court went so far as to
quote an early opinion that essentially stated the manufacturer could
insure consumers against injuries from their products.8 1
A second rationale discussed by the court in support of imposing strict
liability was that strict liability relieves a plaintiff of the burden of
proving negligence, which is often difficult.8 2 As the court observed: "[I]t
is often difficult, or even impossible, to prove negligence on the part of
the manufacturer or supplier . . . strict liability eliminates the need of
the proof." 83 The court further cited several other New Mexico cases
relying on the rationale that the imposition of strict liability relieves the
plaintiff of the onerous burden of proving negligence. 4
A third rationale discussed by the court was that strict liability provides
a powerful incentive for suppliers to distribute products only from responsible manufacturers who design safe products and bear the pecuniary
consequences for their defective products. 85 Without strict liability, the
suppliers may not be liable as mere idle suppliers.8 6 Confronted with
possible liability, however, suppliers may be more inclined only to select
products from reputable manufacturers. 7 In addition, suppliers are in a
much stronger bargaining position than consumers to influence manufacturers.88 Furthermore, the supplier provides another pocket for the
plaintiff.8 9 The policy of providing a full chain of supply protection from
the manufacturer up to the supplier was supported by the same two

78. Id. at 377, 902 P.2d at 59.
79. Id. at 375, 902 P.2d at 57.
80. Id. (quoting Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (1978)).
81. Id. at 375, 902 P.2d at 57 (a manufacturer could be held "strictly liable for the resulting
injuries because 'the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
(quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,
public as a cost of doing business'
440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring))).
82. Id.
83. Brooks. 120 N.M. at 375-76, 902 P.2d at 57-58 (quoting John W. Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973)).
84. Id. at 377, 902 P.2d at 59 (citing Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 67,
618 P.2d 1230, 1231 (1980) ("The purpose behind strict products liability . . .is to allow an injured
consumer to recover against a seller or manufacturer without the requirement of proving ordinary
negligence."); Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 88; 738 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Ct. App), cert. denied,
106 N.M. 24, 738 P.2d 518 (1987); Livingston v. Begay, 98 N.M. 712, 716, 652 P.2d 734, 738
(1982) ("the rationales behind the application of strict liability do not apply when ... proof of
negligence is not difficult.").
85. Id. at 376, 902 P.2d at 58.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 376, 902 P.2d at 58.
89. Id.
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cases that the Brooks court used to support the cost distribution rationale
to impose strict liability standards.9
Finally, the court considered whether the imposition of strict liability
"serves the interests of fairness." 9' The Brooks court reasoned that in
the interest of fairness, the manufacturer who profited from the sale of
the product should accept the risk of loss. 92 The opinion notes that the
underlying assumption for this policy is that fairness dictates "that the
cost of an unreasonable risk of harm [should] lie with the product and
its possibly innocent manufacturer [rather] than . . . upon the often
93
unsuspecting consumer ....
Balancing the Policy Considerations Supporting Negligence or
Strict Liability
According to the Brooks court, the determining factor in deciding what
the standard of liability for design defect claims should be rests upon
a balancing of the conflicting policy considerations. 94 Imposing a strict
liability standard for design defect claims must be consistent with the
policies of imposing strict liability in general. 95 Additionally, equity considerations addressing the difference, if any, of design defect claims must
not veto the imposition of a strict liability standard. 96 The liability standard
that grants the greatest benefits via its policies should control. 97 The court
of strict products
concluded that the benefits provided by the imposition
98
liability far outweighed the rivaling considerations.
C.

Compliance with Applicable Regulations Does Not Invalidate a
Design Defect Claim
The Brooks court held that evidence that the manufacturer had not
violated any applicable regulations, codes, or industry standards was
relevant to a design defect claim, but it was not conclusive on the issue. 99
It reasoned that "general and traditional rules of relevance and materiality" should be applied in such cases.'00 The court cited Uniform Jury
Instructions, which state that industry customs are not conclusive of
ordinary care, as support for its holding that compliance with regulations
does not vitiate a negligence cause of action.' 0 '
D.

90. Id. at 377, 902 P.2d at 59 (citing Aalco Mfg. Co., 95 N.M. at 67, 618 P.2d at 1231, "the
extension of strict liability to non-negligent retailers provides two pockets from which the injured
consumer can obtain relief, one being the usually local and more accessible retailer."; see also
Trujillo, 106 N.M. at 88, 738 P.2d at 1333).
91. Id. at 376, 902 P.2d at 58.
92. Id. (quoting Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (1982)).
93. Id.
94. Id.at 377, 902 P.2d at 59.
95. Brooks, 120 N.M. at 377, 902 P.2d at 59.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 379, 902 P.2d at 61.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 381-82, 902 P.2d at 63-64.
100. Id. at 382, 902 P.2d at 64.
101. Brooks, 120 N.M.
1405 and 13-1408).

at 382, 902 P.2d at 64 (citing N.M. UNIF. JuRY INSTRUCTION Crv. 13-
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ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

Analysis of the Brooks' Decision
The Brooks court overruled Duran and imposed strict liability standards
for injuries caused and enhanced by design defects because it concluded
that doing so would further the policies supporting the adoption of the
doctrine of strict products liability. °2 The policies discussed in Brooks
could however, support the imposition of strict liability on a manufacturer
for any cause of action, not simply defective design. 03 If strict liability
is imposed on the manufacturer, the manufacturer will have to distribute
the cost or suffer the economic burden. Furthermore, strict liability always
relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving negligence. Imposition of
a strict liability standard would also, by definition, always provide a full
chain of supply protection providing an additional source of recovery
for the plaintiff. Finally, if fairness dictates that the party who profits
from the distribution of a product should pay, the paying party would
again always be the manufacturer instead of the plaintiff. Consequently,
these policies support the imposition of a strict liability standard on any
profit-making entity, which is certainly not the result the court intended.
The two traditional policy justifications supporting the imposition of
strict liability are (1) "compensation of injured victims (spreading losses),"
and (2) "deterrence of unsafe products (internalizing costs)."' 4 A negligence liability standard for defective designs would not violate these
traditional strict liability policies and could support many more, such as
responsibility for foreseeable harms.
B.

Implications of the Brooks Case
Two disturbing overall consequences of the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision in Brooks are probable. Design defect claims will proliferate and the Restatement (Third) of Torts will not be adopted in New
Mexico.
1. Proliferation of Design Defect Product Liability Claims in New
Mexico
Defective design claims can be predicted to proliferate simply because
the plaintiff is now relieved of the burden of proving the defendant's
negligence. Relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving negligence is
one of the primary policies supporting the imposition of strict liability.
Arguably, this policy will encourage more potential plaintiffs to file claims
and will facilitate their success. Furthermore, defendants cannot escape
liability even if they have complied with all applicable regulations. It is,

102. Id. at 383, 902 P.2d at 65.
103. See generally id. at 377, 902 P.2d at 59.
104. See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial
in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 105758 (1994) (citations omitted).
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therefore, equally predictable that restricting or eliminating this fundamental defense for potential defendants will also encourage more plaintiffs
to file suits and facilitate their success.
The proliferation of design defect claims will cause defense and insurance costs to increase along with liability losses. More product liability
claims may also have a direct result on the cost and/or profitability of
product lines. Such a proliferation of claims ultimately could cause a
dramatic decline in the production of a product line, as evidenced by
the aviation industry. 05
Permitting design defect claims under a strict liability standard enlarges
the enhanced injury doctrine to a detrimental extent. The slope the court
is moving down is made more slippery by diminishing reliance on extrajudicial guidelines to determine whether or not a product is defective.
To permit filing of design defect claims sounding in strict liability upon
the mere opinion of an expert that the product is defective, even though
the product complies with all applicable regulations, codes and safety
standards, encourages unjustified litigation. It is inherently illogical that
the testimony of one or two hired experts be given the same weight as
safety standards carefully researched, investigated and promulgated by
an expert agency. As one commentator recently noted:
[U]nchecked, careless, or confusing expansion of the [enhanced injury]
doctrine poses a genuine threat to the ability of American manufacturers to compete in worldwide markets, as well as to the ability of
average Americans to afford products and equipment as rising litigation
and settlement costs continue to be passed on to consumers and
businesses. l01

2.

The Restatement (Third) of Torts Will Not be Adopted in New
Mexico
The American Law Institute (ALI) undertook the task of creating the
restatements, striving to make clear statements of the law currently in
force in the majority of the states from the plethora of case law and
legal literature. 01 7 The primary purpose of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts is to bring greater certainty, consistency, and predictability into

105. According to the defendant-appellee's answer brief, a Senate subcommittee found:
[t]he 3 largest manufacturers of piston-engine aircraft have essentially left the light
aircraft segment of the industry. In 1986, Cessna, which had been the largest
manufacturer of piston-engine models, dropped completely out of that business.
Last year, Beech manufactured only 18 percent of the production of piston aircraft
it made in 1978. Piper's production of piston aircraft has dropped to 2 percent
of the 1978 level. Piper has been in bankruptcy since 1991.
Brief for Appellee at 25, Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (1995)
(quoting S. REP. No. 202, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993)).
106. Heather Fox Vickles & Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal Enhanced
Liability, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 417, 418 (1995).
107. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of ProductsLiability: The ALl Restatement Project,
48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 632-33 (1995).
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the law of products liability. This objective, however, is not attainable
if the Restatement is not widely adopted.
Ironically, while the ALI was adopting a negligence standard of liability
in design defect cases in the new Restatement, the New Mexico Supreme
Court was rejecting that standard in favor of a strict liability standard. 08
The only conclusion to be drawn from the juxtaposition of these two
events is that the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Brooks is
out of step with the majority of courts in this country.
The Restatement specifically states that it
adopts a reasonableness ('risk-utility' balancing) test as the standard
for judging the defectiveness of product designs. More specifically,
the test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable
cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design rendered
the product not reasonably safe .... That standard is also used in
administering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence
.... The policy reasons that support use of a reasonable person
perspective in connection with the general negligence standard also
support its use in the products liability context.'0 9
The essential conflict between the Restatement and the Brooks' decision
is the separate treatment of manufacturing and design defects. The New
Mexico Supreme Court in Brooks held that a strict liability approach
would be applied equally to design defects and manufacturing flaws."10
The Restatement has adopted a strict liability standard for manufacturing
defects and a negligence standard for design defect claims."' The Restatement makes a distinction between these standards on the grounds
that a product with a design defect meets the manufacturer's own design
specifications or quality standards while a product with a manufacturing
defect does not." 2 Therefore, a manufacturing defect is easily identifiable
since the defective product can be compared to the manufacturer's plans,
specifications, standards, or with other units in the product line." 3
With an alleged design defect, however, the question becomes, "How
much safety is enough?" To answer that question the manufacturer must
go outside the product line to determine whether the product specifications
themselves are defective in that they create unreasonable risks." 4 The
core of the design defect inquiry under the Restatement thus focuses on
balancing the manufacturer's design decisions. In contrast, the Brooks
court found "nothing in the difference between manufacturing flaws and
design defects.""' 5

108. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 2, § 2 cmt. a; see also Brooks v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.,
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (1995).
§ 2 cmt. c, at 19 (emphasis added).
Brooks, 120 N.M. at 378-79, 383, 902 P.2d at 60-61, 65.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 2, § 2 cmt. a, at 12-16, 19-22.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 2 cmt. a, at 14.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 2 cmt. b, at 17.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 2 cmt. c, at 19.
115. BrQoks, 120 N.M. at 377, 902 P.2d at 61.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 34,
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The Restatement reflects the view adopted by most courts that the rule
imposing a strict liability standard as developed for manufacturing defects
is inappropriate for the resolution of design defect cases. 116 The Restatement employs a negligence test of risk-utility balancing to determine
whether a design is defective." 7 Logically, a more flexible rule is required
for design versus manufacturing defects because a design defect cannot
be mechanically determined. Imposition of a strict liability standard for
design defects will likely result in a proliferation -of such claims. The
difference between the Restatement standard and the standard adopted
in Brooks also ensures that the Restatement will not be adopted in New
Mexico and the benefits flowing from the Restatement will be lost.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp. held that a plaintiff can bring all
design defect claims, including crashworthiness or enhanced injury claims,
in strict liability."' Brooks further held that a defendant's compliance
with all applicable regulations, codes, or standards is not necessarily a
valid defense to a design defect claim." 9
The application of a negligence standard of liability in design defect
cases, abandoned by Brooks, would have permitted the jury to consider
all relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of a product's design,
including the effect of product misuse or comparative fault by the product
user. A negligence standard of liability would have preserved the plaintiff's
right to recover for injuries caused by a defectively designed product
without breaching the policy rationales of loss spreading and deterrence.
Instead, the sweeping scope of Brooks opens the door for vast and
potentially unlimited liability that makes the manufacturer a virtual insurer
of all consumers, including the careless, irresponsible risk-takers. Brooks
also reflects the growing pro-plaintiff bias in New Mexico courts and
contributes to the gradual conversion from fault principles to a social
insurance principle. It furthers the disadvantages of strict tort liability
by nurturing a "victimization" of the individual and lack of personal
responsibility. Finally, a system of ad hoc decision making is created,
and the judicial system takes on an aura of a high-jackpot lottery.
PATRICIA M. MONAGHAN

116.
117.
118.
119.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 2, Reporter's Note to cmt. a, at 47-8.
See id. § 2 cmt. c, at 19.
Brooks, 120 N.M. at 373, 383, 902 P.2d at 55, 65.
Id.

